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In December 2013, the primary United States financial regulatory agencies jointly 
adopted final rules to implement Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, which is often referred to as the “Volcker Rule”.  Section 
619 prohibits banks from engaging in activities considered to be particularly risky, 
including proprietary trading and owning hedge funds or private equity funds.  
Banking regulators designed the final rule against proprietary trading in part to 
prevent losses like the $6 billion London Whale loss that took place in 2012 at 
JPMorgan Chase.  Given the controversial nature of the Volcker Rule, it is not 
surprising that the regulatory agencies received 18,000 comment letters, including a 
67-page letter from JPMorgan Chase. 
  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1   This case study is one of nine produced by the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) 
examining issues related to the JPMorgan Chase London Whale.  The following are the other case 
studies in this case series: 
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale A: Risky Business 
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale B: Derivatives Valuation 
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale C: Risk Limits, Metrics, and Models 
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale D: Risk Management Practices 
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale E: Supervisory Oversight 
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale F: Required Securities Disclosures 
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale H: Cross-Border Regulation 
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale Z: Background & Overview. 
Cases are available at the Journal of Financial Crises.  
2   Project Editor, Case Study and Research, YPFS, Yale School of Management. The authors 
acknowledge helpful comments from Karen Braun-Munzinger. 




1.   Introduction 
On December 10, 2013, a handful of United States regulatory agencies jointly adopted final 
rules to implement Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act).  Section 619 is often referred to as the “Volcker Rule” after 
one of its principal supporters, former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker.  This part of 
the Dodd-Frank Act is intended to make the banking system safer by prohibiting banks from 
engaging in activities considered to be particularly risky, including using the bank’s own 
money to generate trading profits (known as proprietary trading) and owning hedge funds 
or private equity funds. 
The Volcker Rule is widely considered to be one of the most controversial aspects of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, as evidenced by the 18,000 comment letters that the regulatory agencies 
received and the three years that it took them to finalize the detailed rules.  Banks were 
particularly concerned that activities prohibited by the Volcker Rule were so similar to 
existing core financial intermediation functions that the rule would have many unintended 
negative consequences for bank profitability and risk management.  In its final form, banks 
are permitted by the Volcker Rule to hedge the specific, identifiable risks that they face, as 
well as to continue underwriting and market-making activities on behalf of their customers. 
Though the Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law in 2010 in response to the financial crisis of 
2007-2009, the negotiations over the Volcker Rule were greatly impacted by the fact that 
JPMorgan Chase & Company (JPM) lost over $6 billion in 2012 because of complex credit 
derivatives trades made by Bruno Iksil, who came to be known as the “London Whale” 
because of the large size of his trades. Iksil worked for the bank’s Chief Investment Office 
(CIO) as senior trader for the Synthetic Credit Portfolio (SCP), which consisted of long and 
short positions in credit default swaps to help hedge the credit risk facing the bank.  Though 
Iksil’s trading activity in 2012 preceded the completion of the Volcker Rule regulations in 
December 2013, banking regulators designed the prohibition against proprietary trading in 
part to prevent future trading losses like those at JPM. 
CIO’s credit trading began in 2006, and an internal audit review a year later noted that this 
activity consisted of “proprietary position strategies”.  In the aftermath of the revelation of 
the London Whale trading strategy, both senior bank management and the internal task 
force charged with investigating the loss consistently maintained that the SCP was intended 
to offset some of the credit risk that the bank faced.  However, when questioned by the US 
Senate subcommittee investigating the matter, CIO leadership and other bank officials 
provided conflicting answers about which assets or portfolios the SCP was supposed to 
hedge, ranging from only part of another CIO portfolio to the entirety of JPM’s balance sheet. 
SCP personnel could not produce documentation of what specific credit risks they were 
supposed to offset, how they decided which derivatives to use as hedges and in what 
quantity, and if they tested that the hedges in fact reduced risk as expected.  Whereas CIO 
recorded, tracked, and regularly tested the effectiveness of its hedges against risks 
associated with interest rates and mortgage servicing rights to qualify for favorable 
accounting treatment, the SCP traders did not follow these procedures.  Furthermore, an 
internal analysis prepared in 2012 showed that SCP personnel were compensated in 2010 
and 2011 largely based on compensation paid to investment bank sales and trading staff, 
rather than to risk management staff. 
The remainder of the case is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the key provisions of 
the Volcker Rule, especially with respect to the ban on proprietary trading.  Section 3 
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provides a brief overview of the history of the CIO and its SCP portfolio.  Section 4 introduces 
evidence about SCP’s purpose and related documentation.  Section 5 describes how key CIO 
personnel were paid.  Section 6 concludes with a brief summary of a study conducted by the 
US Government Accountability Office of possible risks posed by proprietary trading.  See 
Appendix 1 for a timeline of key events pertinent to this case module. 
Questions 
1. Are the Volcker Rule prohibitions desirable and likely to be effective in reducing 
systemic risk? 
2. Do the provisions of the Volcker Rule unwisely restrict bank profitability and risk 
management? 
3. Would CIO’s credit derivative trading activities (and documentation) have qualified 
as a permitted risk-mitigating hedging activity under the Volcker Rule? 
4. How might the CIO compensation structure have contributed to the 2012 trading 
loss? 
2.   Overview of the Volcker Rule 
The Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law on July 21, 2010.  One of the most controversial 
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act is contained in Section 619, which is often referred to as 
the “Volcker Rule” after one of its main advocates, former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul 
Volcker.  Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act added a new section, section 13, to the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956 that, subject to certain exemptions, prohibits banking entities 
from engaging in proprietary trading and from owning, sponsoring, or having certain other 
relationships with hedge funds or private equity funds (termed “covered funds” by the rule). 
The Federal Reserve Board, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission jointly proposed a common set of rules in 2011 and 
2012 to implement Section 619 in an unusual display of interagency regulatory cooperation.  
As a sign of the importance of the Volcker Rule and of the controversy that the rule generated, 
the agencies collectively received over 18,000 comment letters in response to their 
proposals, including a 67-page letter from JPM.  After reviewing the comment letters and 
making revisions, the agencies jointly adopted the final Volcker Rule on December 10, 2013. 
Given the facts surrounding the London Whale trades at JPM, this module will focus on the 
Volcker Rule’s ban on proprietary trading, rather than the rule’s restriction on covered funds.  
Subject to certain exemptions, the Volcker Rule prohibits banking entities from engaging in 
“proprietary trading”, which is defined as “engaging as principal for the trading account of 
the banking entity in any purchase or sale of one or more financial instruments.” (Volcker 
Attachment A, 6) 
Whereas the US placed a ban on proprietary trading by any part of a bank holding company, 
the United Kingdom took a different approach with its banks by requiring the deposit-taking 
unit(s) of a bank holding company to be legally, economically, and operationally separate 
from the rest of the holding company (known as “ring-fencing”), but allowing proprietary 
trading in non-deposit-taking units.  A 2014 proposal by the European Commission 
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combines elements of both approaches, banning proprietary trading by European Union 
banks and ring-fencing other high-risk trading activities. (Shearman & Sterling 2014, 9-15) 
Whereas securities, derivatives, and commodity futures (and options on each) fall within the 
scope of the Volcker Rule, traditional bank loans are not considered financial instruments 
for purposes of the rule.  Because proprietary trading is often short-term, the Volcker Rule 
includes a presumption that a financial instrument held for fewer than 60 days is held as part 
of a proprietary trading strategy, though a bank may rebut this presumption. (Volcker 
Attachment A, 7) 
The final regulations specifically exclude some types of transactions from the definition of 
proprietary trading, while also permitting banks to continue certain activities that are part 
of their core operations.  Proprietary trading specifically does not include purchases or sales 
of financial instruments under repurchase (or reverse repurchase) agreements, written 
securities lending agreements, documented liquidity management plans, and deferred 
compensation (and similar) plans.  Purchases or sales by a bank to satisfy a legal or 
regulatory obligation or when the bank is acting solely as an agent, broker, or custodian are 
also specifically excluded. 
Banks are permitted to continue underwriting and market-making activities on behalf of 
their customers.  Underwriting activities are allowed as long as the bank acts as an 
underwriter to distribute (public or private) securities offerings and the trading desk’s 
position in the securities being offered is solely for distribution purposes.  Bank trading 
desks are also allowed to make markets in financial instruments by providing quotes and 
standing ready to buy and sell such instruments.  For both underwriting and market-making, 
the amount and type of securities held by the trading desk in its inventory should not exceed 
the “reasonably expected near term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties.” 
(Volcker Attachment A, 11, 13)  Furthermore, the bank must maintain a compliance program 
(discussed below), and employees engaged in underwriting or market-making cannot be 
compensated “to reward or incentivize prohibited proprietary trading.” (Volcker 
Attachment A, 12, 14-15) 
Banks also expressed concern in their comment letters that the Volcker Rule would prohibit 
risk management activities in which banks have long engaged, such as asset-liability 
management (ALM).  In its comment letter, JPM noted that whereas ALM is “one of the 
foundations of bank safety and soundness and is integral to the stability of the U.S. and global 
financial systems,” the proposed rule could prohibit or restrict certain sound risk reduction 
strategies. (JPM Comment Letter, 50)  JPM spent three pages describing “several examples of 
asset-liability hedging strategies employed by JPMorgan during the crisis that enabled it to 
successfully deal with market, credit, interest rate, and liquidity risks that arose during the 
period.”  One of the examples that JPM gave was “[m]anaging credit risk by use of credit 
derivatives.”  (JPM Comment Letter, 56-59) 
One area of concern expressed by JPM was that certain “traditional and long-established 
ALM activities” use financial instruments that must be accounted for in the market risk 
capital trading account and would thus be deemed proprietary in nature under the proposed 
rule.  In addition, JPM commented that the dynamic nature of financial markets and bank-
specific asset and liability cash flows may require a bank to exit a position in less than 60 
days to effectively hedge its risks, even though such a short holding period is presumed to 
be proprietary.  Another of JPM’s concerns was the restriction that banks could only hedge 
against those risks to which they were already exposed or would become exposed in the very 
near future, whereas JPM noted that banks should prudently hedge against possible future 
risks as revealed by a stress test. (JPM Comment Letter, 52-54) 
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However, the final regulations do permit “risk-mitigating hedging activity” as long as such 
activity “is designed to reduce or otherwise significantly mitigate and demonstrably reduces 
or otherwise significantly mitigates one or more specific, identifiable risks” [emphasis 
added]. (Volcker Attachment A, 16)  Not only must a bank identify the specific risk being 
hedged, but a bank must also conduct a correlation analysis and independent testing to 
support the assertion that the proposed hedging strategy will in fact reduce risk.  The 
effectiveness of the hedges must be monitored on an ongoing basis and recalibrated as 
necessary.  Furthermore, the bank must document which trading desk establishes and 
maintains the hedge, which specific identifiable risk is being hedged, and what strategy is 
being used to mitigate the risk. (Volcker Fact Sheet, 2) 
The Volcker Rule requires banks to add to their existing internal control processes a 
“compliance program reasonably designed to ensure and monitor compliance with the 
prohibitions and restrictions on proprietary trading and covered fund activities and 
investments.”  The compliance program must include written policies and procedures, a 
management framework and system of internal controls, training for affected personnel, 
independent testing of the effectiveness of the compliance program, and record-keeping 
sufficient to demonstrate compliance to the bank’s regulator.  (Volcker Attachment A, 48-
49). 
In addition, large banks with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more must also 
“establish, maintain, and enforce an enhanced compliance program”.  A large bank’s Chief 
Executive Officer must annually attest in writing to the bank’s regulator that the bank has 
processes in place to “establish, maintain, enforce, review, test, and modify” the program to 
achieve compliance with the Volcker Rule. (Volcker Attachment A, 62, 70-71) 
In addition, the Volcker Rule requires banks with significant trading operations to 
continuously record and periodically report to their regulator certain quantitative 
measurements pertaining to their trading activities.  Those banks with trading assets and 
liabilities equal to or greater than $50 billion must report the items listed below at the 
individual trading desk level within 10 days of the end of each calendar month beginning 
June 30, 2014.  Smaller banks will report quarterly beginning in 2016. (Volcker Attachment 
A, 50, 55) 
1. Risk and Position Limits and Usage 
2. Risk Factor Sensitivities 
3. Value at Risk and Stress VaR 
4. Comprehensive Profit and Loss Attribution 
5. Inventory Turnover 
6. Inventory Aging 
7. Customer-Facing Trade Ratio 
(See Davis Polk 2013 for an extensive series of flowcharts “designed to assist banking 
entities in identifying permissible and impermissible proprietary trading activities” under 
the final Volcker Rule regulations.) 
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3.  The Chief Investment Office and Synthetic Credit Portfolio 
JPM provides a wide variety of financial services, yet its commercial bank subsidiaries still 
engage in the basic banking functions of taking deposits from and making loans to customers.  
Over many years, the amount of deposits held by JPM on behalf of its customers was 
consistently greater than the amount of money that the bank loaned. 
As a result, JPM needed a way to profitably and safely invest these excess deposits, and this 
task was assigned to and became the primary responsibility of the bank’s Chief Investment 
Office (CIO).  With $521 million of deposits but only $402 million of loans receivable at 
December 31, 2004, JPM separated the CIO from the internal treasury department in 2005.  
Ina Drew, who was JPM’s Chief Investment Officer, was appointed to lead the CIO. 
CIO had various additional responsibilities, including funding JPM’s retirement plans, as well 
as hedging risks associated with interest rates and mortgage servicing rights on behalf of 
other units within the bank.  An important secondary function of CIO was to help JPM reduce 
its credit risk.  As a bank, a major risk facing JPM is credit risk, also known as default risk, 
which is the possibility that someone who had borrowed from the bank (either directly in 
the form of a loan, or indirectly via the fixed income securities owned by CIO or other units 
of the bank) is unwilling and/or unable to repay the money that they owe. 
In May 2006, CIO approved a proposal by Achilles Macris, the International Chief Investment 
Officer and Drew’s subordinate, to begin trading credit derivatives, such as credit default 
swaps, as a business hedge to “effectively manage residual exposures created by [JPM’s] 
operating businesses”. (US Senate Exhibits, 36-37) 
Thus, in addition to investing excess deposits in low-risk high-quality bond holdings, CIO 
purchased default protection using credit derivatives to partially hedge JPM’s exposure to 
credit risk that arose from the bank’s lending activities.  At what point in time this strategy 
acquired the name Synthetic Credit Portfolio (SCP) remains unclear, but certainly was the 
case by 2008. 
Three London-based CIO employees were responsible for the SCP on a daily basis.  Javier 
Martin-Artajo, the head of credit and equity trading, reported to Macris and directly oversaw 
the SCP.  Bruno Iksil, who would come to be known as the “London Whale”, reported to 
Martin-Artajo and was the head trader for the SCP.  Julien Grout was a junior trader and 
reported to Mr. Iksil.  (See Zeissler, et al. 2014A  for a definition of credit default swaps and 
related terminology, as well as a detailed description of the trading strategies pursued by the 
SCP team.) 
4.  Hedging or Proprietary Trading? 
While the CIO was in charge of a number of different portfolios, one important issue 
surrounding the SCP specifically was whether the portfolio evolved over time from a purely 
hedging function to also incorporate proprietary trading. 
As discussed in Section 3, Macris received approval in May 2006 to begin trading credit 
derivatives.  The CIO approval document to commence credit trading stated that JPM’s 
largest concentration of risk from its operating businesses was “cyclical exposure to credit” 
and that CIO wanted the capability to “manage corporate credit exposures and diversify its 
asset classes.” (US Senate Exhibits, 36-37) 
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JPM completed the initial internal audit review of what it termed “CIO Global Credit Trading” 
in November 2007.  In the final audit report, the business overview began by noting that CIO 
“credit trading activities commenced in 2006 and are proprietary position strategies 
executed on credit and asset back indices.” (US Senate Exhibits, 57-58) 
During Drew’s interview with the US Senate subcommittee investigating the CIO losses, she 
approved a drawing indicating that, at the beginning of 2012, SCP was part of the larger 
“Tactical Asset Allocation” portfolio, which itself was formerly known as the “Discretionary 
Trading Book” (see Figure 1).  A former co-head of JPM’s investment bank stated to the US 
Senate subcommittee that discretionary trading is in fact synonymous with proprietary 
trading. 
A report issued January 2013 by the internal JPMorgan Chase Management Task Force (JPM 
Task Force) that investigated the London Whale losses stated “The Synthetic Credit Portfolio 
managed by CIO was intended generally to offset some of the credit risk that JPMorgan faces, 
including in its CIO investment portfolio and in its capacity as a lender.” (JPM Task Force 
2013, 2)  However, the SCP traders could produce no documentation of what these credit 
risks were, what hedges would be used, or how to test hedge effectiveness. (US Senate 
Report, 4)  In other US Senate testimony, JPM officials acknowledged that the CIO never 
documented SCP’s purpose or intended manner of working, nor did the CIO ever issue a 
policy delineating SCP hedging parameters or strategies. 
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Figure 1: US Senate Drawing Approved by Ina Drew 
 
Source: US Senate Report, 41 
 
Credit default swaps and other derivatives can be used to hedge a specific asset or 
transaction, or to provide protection in a more general way.  In a dedicated hedge, position 
ABC specifically hedges position XYZ, and both positions are recorded accordingly with 
offsetting gains and losses. (US Senate Report, 45)  For example, a farmer obligated to deliver 
1,000 bushels of corn may enter into a futures contract with the opposite exposure to offset 
future changes in corn prices. 
However, CIO and other bank officials gave inconsistent answers to the US Senate 
subcommittee about which assets or portfolios the SCP was supposed to hedge, ranging from 
a portion of CIO’s own portfolio of fixed income securities to the firm’s balance sheet as a 
whole (what is referred to as a “top of the house” hedge).  John Wilmot, who was CIO Chief 
Financial Officer from January 2011 until the immediate aftermath of the CIO losses in May 
2012, stated that assets to be hedged by the SCP were not specifically defined in writing.  Ms. 
Drew admitted that determining the size and nature of the hedge was therefore a 
“guesstimate”.  (US Senate Report, 44) 
JPM’s corporate counsel told the US Senate subcommittee that the SCP was not supposed to 
function as a dedicated hedge of a specific asset or transaction, but was rather intended to 
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protect against “tail risks” facing the bank, meaning risks characterized by low frequency yet 
high severity (i.e., unlikely, but costly).  However, bank officials again gave conflicting 
descriptions of the types of tail risks the SCP was expected to mitigate. 
In addition to investing excess deposits, the CIO would also hedge risks related to interest 
rates and mortgage servicing rights for other groups within JPM, with data about these 
hedges given to JPM Chief Financial Officer Douglas Braunstein on a weekly basis.  While 
these particular CIO hedges were recorded, tracked, and regularly tested for hedge 
effectiveness (to qualify for favorable accounting treatment), the SCP hedges were not.  JPM’s 
2011 annual report filed on Form 10-K with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
described the detailed procedures that the bank used to track those derivatives designated 
as hedges: 
… for a derivative to be designated as a hedge, the risk management objective and 
strategy must be documented.  Hedge documentation must identify the derivative 
hedging instrument, the asset or liability or forecasted transaction and type of risk to 
be hedged, and how the effectiveness of the derivative is assessed prospectively and 
retrospectively. . . .  The extent to which a derivative has been, and is expected to 
continue to be, effective at offsetting changes in the fair value or cash flows of the 
hedged item must be assessed and documented at least quarterly.  (JPM 10-K 2011, 
202-203) 
Senior JPM executives have stated that the SCP would not have required such procedures 
and documents, since it was not intended as a dedicated hedge, but rather as a macro hedge 
to protect the bank as a whole against credit risk during another financial crisis or other 
stress event.  Nevertheless, sensible risk management would dictate that the bank have some 
means to size the SCP and to gauge its effectiveness as a macro hedge. (US Senate Report, 48) 
The first news stories about Iksil and his large credit derivatives trades appeared in 
Bloomberg and the Wall Street Journal on April 6, 2012.  Braunstein addressed some of the 
concerns in a conference call on April 13 to announce the bank’s first quarter earnings.  On 
the call, Braunstein stated “we have put on [the credit derivative] positions to manage for a 
significant stress event in credit.” (US Senate Exhibits, 437) 
To properly function as a hedge, SCP should have been profitable in a weak credit 
environment when the rest of JPM was experiencing losses from borrower defaults.  
However, Wilmot sent an analysis to Chief Executive Officer Jamie Dimon and to Braunstein 
on April 11, just two days before the earnings call, showing that SCP would in fact lose money 
if credit spreads widened in anticipation of increased defaults. (US Senate Report, 278)  (See 
also Zeissler, et al. 2014F for a discussion of whether Braunstein’s comments on the earnings 
call may have violated securities laws that make it illegal for an issuer to make false 
statements or to omit material facts in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.) 
5.  CIO Compensation 
Like other financial firms, JPM used an incentive-based compensation system “premised on 
the basic assumption that one of the factors that influence individuals’ performance and 
conduct is financial reward”. (JPM Task Force 2013, 91) 
CIO did not have its own incentive compensation system, but instead participated in the 
bank-wide incentive compensation system overseen by the JPM Board of Directors.  As such, 
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CIO personnel were compensated by reference to how employees in other lines of business 
at JPM were paid, in addition to independent third party compensation survey data. 
In June 2012, after the London Whale trades were public, the JPM Task Force prepared an 
analysis of the total compensation received in 2010 and 2011 by the key participants in the 
SCP trades: Drew, Macris,  
Figure 2: Seat Value Comparisons Chart 
 
Source: US Senate Report, 58 
 
Martin-Artajo, Iksil, Grout, and two other traders (see Figure 2).  Of interest is whether the 
compensation of these individuals was set relative to risk managers (i.e., SCP as hedging 
operation) or relative to traders (i.e., SCP as proprietary trading operation). 
The primary internal reference groups for setting compensation were employees in the 
Investment Bank (considered to be a profit center) and in certain Sales & Trading units.  The 
analysis makes no mention of risk management compensation, a cost center within the bank.  
Also noteworthy is that 2011 compensation for Drew, Macris, Martin-Artajo, and Iksil were 
all higher than comparable positions within the Investment Bank. (US Senate Exhibits, 22) 
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Nevertheless, the JPM Task Force concluded that “there does not appear to be any 
fundamental flaw in the way compensation was and is structured for CIO personnel”, albeit 
acknowledging that the bank must make front office staff who are assigned to tasks not 
expected to generate profits aware that they will “nonetheless be compensated fairly for the 
achievement of the Firm’s objectives, including effective risk management.” (US Senate 
Exhibits, 22) 
6.  Does It Matter? 
Despite the efforts described in Section 2 to implement the Volcker Rule in the US and similar 
rules in other countries, the extent of the role played by proprietary trading in the financial 
crisis of 2007-2009, if any, remains open to debate.  As required by the Dodd-Frank Act, the 
US Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a study in 2010-2011 of the “risks 
and conflicts of interest associated with proprietary trading by and within covered entities”. 
(GAO 2011, 2) 
GAO analyzed data from stand-alone proprietary trading desks of the six largest US bank 
holding companies, including JPM, for the 18 quarterly periods from the third quarter of 
2006 through the fourth quarter of 2010.  Interestingly, GAO was not able to collect 
information about the proprietary activities of non-stand-alone trading desks because the 
banks did not separately break out this activity at the time of the study. 
GAO found that these stand-alone proprietary trading desks were collectively profitable in 
13 quarters, in which they generated total revenue of $15.6 billion.  However, this sum 
represented only about 3% of the average revenues from all sources of the banks involved.  
In the other 5 quarters, the stand-alone proprietary trading desks lost a combined $15.8 
billion, likewise about 3% of revenue from all sources.  This data lead the GAO to conclude 
that “stand-alone proprietary trading generally produced small revenues in most quarters 
and some larger losses during the financial crisis”.  Bank hedge fund and private equity fund 
investments showed a similar pattern. (GAO 2011, Preface) 
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Appendix 1: Timeline of Key Events 
2005  
JPMorgan Chase & Company (JPM) spun off the Chief 
Investment Office (CIO) as a separate unit to invest the bank’s 
excess deposits.  Ina Drew, JPM’s Chief Investment Officer, 
was appointed head of CIO. 
2006  CIO approved a proposal by Achilles Macris to trade credit derivatives. 
2007  
JPM conducted the first internal audit review of “CIO Global 
Credit Trading”.  The final audit report noted that CIO “credit 
trading activities commenced in 2006 and are proprietary 
position strategies”. 
2010 July 21 The Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law. 
2012 First Quarter 
Bruno Iksil and the Synthetic Credit Portfolio (SCP) team 
make the credit derivatives trades that are the source of the 
“London Whale” losses. 
 January 
SCP was part of the larger “Tactical Asset Allocation” portfolio, 
which itself was formerly known as the “Discretionary 
Trading Book”, based on an interview of Drew by the US 
Senate subcommittee investigating the CIO losses. 
 February 13 
JPM sent a comment letter to the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency and other bank regulators, expressing concern 
that SCP’s asset liability management activities “during the 
financial crisis would have been endangered by the proposed 
[Volcker] rule”. 
 March 23 Drew ordered the CIO traders to stop trading the SCP. 
 April 6 Bloomberg and the Wall Street Journal published the first news stories about the “London Whale”. 
 April 11 
CIO Chief Financial Officer John Wilmot sent an analysis to 
JPM Chief Executive Officer Jamie Dimon and JPM Chief 
Financial Officer Douglas Braunstein showing that SCP 
actually would lose money if credit spreads widened in 
anticipation of increased defaults. 
 December 31 Year-to-date SCP losses = $6.2 billion. 
2013 September-October 
Four regulators in the US and one in the UK reached 
settlement agreements with JPM, totaling $1.020 billion in 
penalties. 
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 December 10 
The Federal Reserve System, Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, and Securities and Exchange 
Commission issued the final Volcker Rule. 
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